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Co'mments
IN RE GAULT
AND THE PERSISTING QUESTIONS
OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND LEGAL ETHICS
IN JUVENILE COURTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
"[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone."1
With this seemingly obvious statement, the United States Su-
preme Court has carried the modern day revolution in the area
of criminal procedure into the juvenile courts. Although this deci-
sion, which seems destined to promote great changes in the juve-
nile court systems of the country, undoubtedly dismayed some, it
actually surprised few. Those who have been aware of the recent
ferment in the juvenile court movement were probably only curious
as to why such a decision was not reached much sooner.2 In fact,
during the past two decades, the legal fraternity and the appellate
courts have been questioning with increasing regularity the lack
of legal procedure and due process of law in juvenile courts.3
Though the implications of Gault, the subject of this article, are
clouded with uncertainty, the Court's primary holdings may be
simply stated: 4
* After the completion of this article the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in another juvenile case. In the Matter of Whittington, No. 701, O.T. 1967.
This case raises issues as to standard of proof and other fact finding proce-
dures in juvenile delinquency hearings as well as problems of interroga-
tion and detention of juveniles, all unresolved by the Court in Gault.
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). The Supreme Court's decision was
eight-to-one, with Justice Fortas writing the majority opinion. Justice
Stewart dissented and Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented
in part. Separate concurring opinions were submitted by Justice Black
and Justice White.
2 In 1963 it was stated that "the juvenile court is now in the third stage
in the cycle of social reform: reforms, regrets and revisions." Dembitz,
Ferment and Experiment in New York: Juvenile Cases in the New
Family Court, 48 CoRmEL L.Q. 499 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Dembitz].
3 See, e.g., Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.
1956) and THE STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT, Art. V § 19 (6th ed. 1959),
concerning the right to counsel in juvenile courts.
4 The facts in Gault are examined at length in the Court's opinion. It
is sufficient to note that Gerald Gault, aged 15, was taken into custody
as the result of a neighbor's complaint that he had made lewd tele-
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1) The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies
in cases which may result in the juvenile's commitment to a state
institution.
2) Notice of charges against the juvenile must be furnished to
the child and his parents or guardian prior to the court proceedings
and must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity." The
commonly used general allegations of delinquency are no longer
acceptable.
3) The child and his parent must be advised of their right to
counsel and if they are unable to afford counsel, of the right to court
appointed counsel. The child and parent may, however, waive the
right to legal representation.
4) The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable and
juveniles must be adequately apprised of their right to remain
silent.
5) Absent an adequate and valid confession, confrontation and
sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination are
essential for a finding of delinquency.
Previously such fundamental rights, upon which our country's
methods of promoting justice are based, have not been considered
an essential element of the juvenile court process.5 The reformers
who designed the juvenile court system believed the application
phone calls. After a highly informal hearing before an Arizona juve-
nile court judge, Gerald was ordered committed to the State Industrial
School as a juvenile delinquent until he should reach his majority.
An adult convicted in Arizona of the same offense would be subject
to a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment for not more than two months.
A habeas corpus action was brought on the ground of denial of various
procedural due process rights. The Arizona State Supreme Court
affirmed dismissal of the writ and the action was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
5 The United States Supreme Court did previously acknowledge the cri-
ticism of this lack of fundamental rights by stating that there are
"serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well
enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity
of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable
to adults." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (dictum).
However, the constitutional questions were not confronted in Kent
as the case turned on a statutory interpretation. For a thorough anal-
ysis of the Kent decision, see Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Con-
stitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167.
6 The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899. For
accounts of the origin and evolution of the juvenile court see, e.g.,
Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1
J. FAmmy L. 151 (1961); Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibility for Young
Offenders, 29 NEB. L. REv. 521 (1950); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909).
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of criminal penalties to juveniles was overly harsh. They sought to
protect youth through the doctrine of parens patriae (sovereign
power of guardianship). Relying on this concept, the notion of a
sheltering juvenile court was developed. This court was held to be
civil, not criminal,7 and was to be helpful and rehabilitative rather
than punitive in nature. In theory, the court was to treat youth
guilty of criminal acts in non-criminal ways. Consequently, pro-
cedural protections afforded defendants in the criminal courts would
not be applicable in the juvenile court.8 The primary objective of
this revolutionary movement was to afford additional protection
to the vulnerable child; however, prior to the enactment of juvenile
acts, criminal prosecutions against juveniles were the same as those
against adults, including the same procedural safeguards.9 Under
the guise of expanded juvenile protection, these procedural rights
were removed from the process10 and herein has reposed the peculiar
paradox of the juvenile courts.'
The juvenile court movement flourished under this concept. No
one could quarrel with the idea of enlarged protection for needy
juveniles. Such children were to receive individualized attention
7 Each of the fifty states has adopted a juvenile court system and in
each state it has been held that such proceedings are not criminal cases.
See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1959) for an ap-
pendix of citations to such authority on a state by state basis.
8 It was originally thought that due process was not at all applicable
in juvenile cases. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57, 62 A.
198, 201 (1905). Today most states grant some piecemeal elements of
adult due process to juveniles. The rights afforded the juvenile may
even vary within a given state.
9 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955).
10 No right to counsel: Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760
(1965); People v. Dotson, 46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956). No right
to confront witneses: In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954);
In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App. 2d 219, 192 P.2d 781 (1947). No doublejeopardy defense: People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262
P. 2d 656 (1953); In re Santillianes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
No right to indictment by grand jury: Childress v. State, 133 Term.
121, 179 S.W. 643 (1915). No right to release on bail: In re Magnuson,
110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952). No right to trial by jury: In re
Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924). No privilege against self-
incrimination: In re Holmes, id.; In re Santillanes, id. No right to
appeal: Application of Gault, supra. No right to notice of charges:
Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944). No right to sworn
testimony: Christensen v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760
(1951).
11 Justice Fortas has indicated "there is evidence, in fact, that there may
be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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relating to the sources of their delinquency and individualized treat-
ment according to their needs. Consequently a wide procedural dis-
cretion was given to the juvenile court judge to ascertain whether
a child was delinquent and to apply the rehabilitative techniques
needed under the particular circumstances.
Furthermore, in order to reach youth in need of the services
of this specialized court, jurisdiction was allowed to include cases
in which the child was not accused of violating any law. Most juve-
nile court statutes provide for original jurisdiction over dependent,
neglected, and wayward children as well as over delinquent chil-
dren who have actually violated a law. 2
Thus, an entirely novel system, designed to protect youth, was
born. The movement began with the highest of aspirations and
was met with immediate acceptance. Certainly if such aspirations
had been realized, the juvenile court system would have prospered
without serious challenge or attack. Unfortunately the juvenile
courts have failed to achieve their goals and have been relentlessly
criticized in recent years. As the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice 3 stated:
Studies conducted by the Commission, legislative inquiries in var-
ious States, and reports by informed observers compel the conclu-
sion that the great hopes originally held for the juvenile court have
not been fulfilled. It has not succeeded significantly in rehabilitating
delinquent youth, in reducing or even stemming the tide of juve-
nile criminality, or in bringing justice and compassion to the child
offender.
To say that juvenile courts have failed to achieve their goals is to
say no more than what is true of criminal courts in the United
States. But failure is most striking when hopes are highest.' 4
Although the challenge to the juvenile courts has in some meas-
ure existed only on the periphery of the broader struggle for pro-
tection of the rights of persons threatened with state intervention
in their daily lives, special considerations are applicable to the juve-
nile court and have been the subject of individualized criticism.
Such criticisms have been founded on the fact that juvenile court
procedures do result in significant governmental restraint upon indi-
vidual freedom without consent. No matter how benevolent the
motives, such interference must be clearly justifiable in order to
allow the denial of constitutional procedures. It is argued that the
12 See e.g., N~s. REv. STAT. § 43-201 (Supp. 1965).
13 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, Task Force Report on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Crime (1967). [hereinafter cited as Task Force].
14 Id. at 7.
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present system fails to meet the need for an accurate determination
of the facts and that the resulting adjudication of delinquency has
become as stigmatizing as being convicted as a criminal. The prom-
ise of rehabilitation has failed and it is apparent that the juvenile
court system is not single-mindedly devoted to the needs of the
child but in fact has assumed the same purposes that mark the
criminal law. Thus, it is argued that current practices of govern-
mental intereference are not justified and that statistics further
show that the exemption of constitutional rights is not warranted.
It is further contended that juvenile courts sometimes treat children
arbitrarily, that scientific knowledge is not so accurate as to reli-
ably predict future behavior, 15 and that the institutions to which
children are sent, despite their lofty purpose, are frequently little
better than prisons for the young.16 In summary, it has been stated
that:
In theory the court's operations could justifiably be informal, its
findings and decisions made without observing ordinary procedural
safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest of the
child. In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive
a child of liberty without due process of law-knowing not what
else to do and needing, whether admittedly or not, to act in the
community's interest even more imperatively than the child's. In
theory it was to exercise its protective powers to bring an errant
child back into the fold. In fact there is increasing reason to believe
that its intervention reinforces the juvenile's unlawful impulses.
In theory it was to concentrate on each case the best of current
social science learning. In fact it has often become a vested interest
in its turn, loathe to cooperate with innovative programs or avail
itself of forward-looking methods.17
The juvenile court is viewed by the public at large as well as
by the children with whom it deals as a court of criminal law. It
has seemed unthinkable to the critics that constitutional rights could
be circumvented by the simple expedient of labeling the proceed-
ings "non-criminal" and yet this, in effect, is what had been per-
mitted. Consequently the growing ranks of the dissenters have been
urging that the juvenile court's jurisdiction be limited to children
who have been accused of violating laws and that legal norms be
15 As an objection to such "anticipatory controls" it has been argued
that: "a sick person has a right not to be treated; it is only when
he becomes contagious that he may be quarantined. The same prin-
ciple of social protection must be applied to the treatment of delin-
quent children...." Nunberg, Problems in the Structure of the Juve-
nile Court, 48 J. CaRi. L.C. & P.S. 500, 507 (1958).
16 See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems
of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 7; Paulsen, Fairness to the
Juvenile Offender, 41 Mnqm. L. REv. 547 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Paulsen].
17 Task Force, supra note 13, at 7.
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adhered to so that the rights of all children to their freedom may
be protected.
The prevalence of juvenile crime is growing ever more alarm-
ing and the rising juvenile crime rate tends to substantiate the
criticism leveled at the juvenile court system.18 One in every nine
children will be referred to a juvenile court for an act of delin-
quency before his eighteenth birthday. Considering boys alone, the
ratio is one in every six.' 9 Specifically,
Arrests of persons under 18 for serious crimes increased 47 percent
in 1965 over 1960; the increase in that age group population for
the same period was 17 percent. In 1965, persons under 18 referred
to juvenile court constituted 24 percent of all persons charged with
forcible rape, 34 percent of all persons charged with robbery, 52
percent of all persons charged with larceny, 61 percent of all per-
sons charged with auto theft.2 0
To support its conclusion in Gault, the Court also referred to
a study of the Stanford Research Institute2 l which found a high
degree of recidivism among juvenile offenders in California during
1965 and 1966. Reliance on these statistics has been criticized on
the grounds that they are merely empirical data,22 but the Court
stated that it was unable "... . to conclude that the absence of consti-
tutional protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system, func-
tioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is
effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders."23
All the criticisms of the juvenile court cannot be directed at the
system alone. The blame must also be placed on the legal profes-
sion and the community as a whole. Most lawyers have shown
little interest in the juvenile court process, many law schools rele-
gate it to a minor role in their curriculum or ignore it completely,
and the community has shown continuing unwillingness to provide
the resources necessary for realizing the court's potential. This was
the state of affairs when the United States Supreme Court entered
the controversy and began filling the gap vacated when others chose
to abrogate their responsibilities.
18 Of course it could be argued that the juvenile crime rate might be
even more alarming were it not for the juvenile courts. One can
only say that if these statistics represent success we certainly cannot
afford failure!
19 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't HEW, Stat. Ser. No. 83, Juvenile Court
Statistics 1 (1964).
20 1965 FBI Uniform Crime Reports 23.
21 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
22 Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811,
812 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lefstein].
23 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
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The most apparent question in relation to Gault is: Just how
sweeping is this decision? Clearly the decision did not make all the
procedural due process safeguards afforded the accused in a crimi-
nal proceeding applicable to the juvenile courts. But, if the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are for the young as well as
the old, how can the juvenile, threatened with a loss of freedom, be
entitled to anything less than the full range of constitutional safe-
guards made available to the similarly threatened adult?
Furthermore, the Court's opinion does not make clear at what
point these limited new juvenile rights spring into being. Mr. Lef-
stein claims that the rules enumerated by the Court "are aimed
solely at reshaping procedures during the juvenile court's adjudica-
tion hearing."24 The Court does state that its holding is concerned
with neither "procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the
pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor ... to the post adjudi-
cative or dispositional processes. '25 Yet Lefstein's conclusion still
seems dubious at best, for the Court, when dealing with the privilege
against self-incrimination, states that "the participation of counsel
will, of course, assist the police, juvenile courts and appellate tribu-
nals in administering the privilege."26
The majority opinion in Gault does not definitively resolve the
issue of the nature of the juvenile proceedings. The question of
whether juvenile proceedings are criminal or civil is not answered
explicitly. The Court does state, however, that "proceedings to
determine 'delinquency,' which may lead to commitment to a state
institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. ' 27 It may be implied from these
statements as well as from a thorough study of the entire opinion,
that the Court is in fact speaking in broader terms than many are
willing to believe.
It is the author's firm belief that further steps will be taken
by our courts and legislatures to insure that further constitutional
requirements of procedural due process are afforded to juveniles
faced with the possibility of a loss of their freedom. It is clear that
the turmoil in the juvenile court movement has not yet died, for
other issues of procedural due process surely will be debated in the
immediate future. It will be the purpose of this paper to explore
these "new" issues as well as the problems attorneys must con-
front as they enter into the juvenile court process in increasing
numbers and with increasing regularity.
24 Lefstein, supra note 22, at 812.
25 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
26 Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 49.
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II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 28
The Supreme Court of Arizona held in Gault that due process
of law is requisite to the constitutional validity of proceedings which
may result in committing the juvenile to an institution in which his
freedom is curtailed.29 The United States Supreme Court had agreed
that "the basic requirements of due process and fairness"3 0 must be
satisfied in such proceedings. However, as outlined above, the
United States Supreme Court, while concurring with the Arizona
court that juveniles were entitled to due process guarantees, differed
completely as to what rights were therefore fundamental. Since
the Supreme Court limited its ruling only to those problems actually
presented in the case, the determination of the full impact of the
due process requirement upon juvenile proceedings remains unre-
solved. In short, a determination must be made as to what rights
are to be guaranteed by due process.
The concept of due process continues to convey various mean-
ings to different people. Anything but certainty has marked its
history and In re GauZt provides no exception to that record. It is
not the purpose of this article to focus on the historical develop-
ment of the due process clause or to analyze the various theories
which have been relied on in determining that a specific right is or
is not contained within that guarantee.8 1 Yet the Court's concept of
the relationship between the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and juvenile court procedures must be grappled with
if one is to attempt to forecast how far the Court may extend its
holding in the future.
Unfortunately the Court provides no clear test for ascertaining
what rights are required by the due process clause in a juvenile
court proceeding. The Court merely concludes that the Constitu-
tion necessitates "the procedural regularity and the exercise of care
implied in the phrase 'due process.' ",32 The Court states that the
rights considered in Gault are required because "fairness, impar-
28 For a penetrating analysis of the constitutional premise behind Gault
see, Welch, Kent v. United States and In re Gault: Two Decisions in
Search of a Theory. 19 HA NGs L.J. 29 (1967).
29 Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965). Other decisions
under both federal and state constitutions are in accord. See, e.g., In
the Matters of Gregory W. & Gerald S., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 24 N.E.2d 102,
277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966); Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.
1959); Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1957).
30 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
31 For such an analysis see Cushman, Incorporation: Due Process and
The Bill of Rights, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 467 (1966).
32 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967).
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tiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process"
'
must be met. Consequently, it is difficult to clearly determine by
what standards the Court concluded that the Arizona proceedings
failed to satisfy the obligations of due process.
The Court's failure to provide a clear standard for the measure-
ment of the due process requirement in a juvenile proceeding is
critized by Mr. Justice Harlan in a separate opinion.34 He maintains
that the due process clause allows the Court "to determine what
forms of procedural protection are necessary to guarantee the funda-
mental fairness of juvenile proceedings."3 5 Such proceedings in his
view are to be conducted "in a fashion consistent with the 'traditions
and conscience of our people.' 86 This concept of the due process
clause has been labeled as the "basic value theory" and would
restrict the Court to prohibiting conduct that offends "a sense of
justice" or "shocks the conscience." Measured by his test, Mr. Just-
ice Harlan concludes that only three procedural requirements
should be required of state juvenile courts: timely notice, right to
counsel, and maintenance of a written record of the proceedings.
3 7
Mr. Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, strongly dissents
from Harlan's concept of the due process clause and defends the
"incorporation" theory that he has so ably promoted in the past.
He concludes that the rights afforded in the Court's opinion should
be clearly granted for the reason that they have been specifically
provided for in the Bill of Rights and are applicable to the States.
He concludes:
Appellants are entitled to these rights, not because "fairness, im-
partiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process"-
require them and not because they are "the procedural rules which
have been fashioned from the generality of due process," but
because they are specifically and unequivocally granted by provi-
sions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments which the Fourteenth
Amendment makes applicable to the States.38
Justice Black criticizes Harlan's view on the grounds that it
claims "for the Court a supreme power to fashion new Bill of Rights
safeguards according to the Court's notions of what fits tradition and
conscience."3 9 Justice Black concludes that no such power is vested
in the judges. He has long maintained that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the entire Bill of Rights
33 Id. at 26.
34 Id. at 67.
35 Id. at 74.
36 Id. at 67.
37 Id. at 72.
8 Id. at 61.
39 Id. at 63-64.
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and makes them applicable to the states. Since the rights in question
in Gault have been incorporated, they clearly apply in the state
juvenile courts. The Court did not adopt either of the rationales
formulated by the two concurring justices but embarked on the
same course of selective incorporation of the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment that it has previously
undertaken with respect to the rights of adults in criminal pro-
ceedings.40
With these various views of the requirements of due process
continuing to compete for acceptance it is difficult to attempt a fore-
cast of future developments. Some procedural issues may be pro-
moted on the grounds that they have previously reached constitu-
tional proportions while others must be analyzed in the light of
the requirements of fundamental fairness.
It will be the purpose of this section to focus attention on other
procedural safeguards which generally continue to be denied the
juvenile although generally afforded the adult who is accused
of committing a crime. It is obvious that many of these procedures
would be of lesser relevance in the case of the dependent, wayward,
or neglected child. It is however, the author's belief that these
"cases" should be removed from the juvenile court's jurisdiction.41
In any event, this section of the article will be primarily concerned
with the juvenile who is accused of a crime. The issues presented
are merely illustrative and not exhaustive.
A. PARTIALLY ANswEm QuEsTioNs
(1) COUNSEL
The issue of the right to counsel has been one of the most heated
subjects of the juvenile court debate. The Supreme Court largely
settled this question when it ruled in Gault that a juvenile has a
right to counsel, appointed by the court if necessary in a case which
might result in his confinement. Several questions remain unan-
swered concerning procedural due process and the right to counsel.4 2
40 Dorsen and Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law,
FAm1my L.Q. 1, 10-11 (1967). The authors of this article were counsel
for the appellants in the United States Supreme Court in the Gault
case.
41 Others have strongly recommended that the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion be limited. See, e.g., Task Force, supra note 13, at 84 & 91. The
court's jurisdiction should be limited to children who violate laws
and other agencies should assume responsibility for the remaining
"cases."
42 This decision also confronts the legal fraternity with many challeng-
ing questions in the area of legal ethics. This subject is discussed
separately below. See Part I infra.
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First, when does the right to counsel arise? The holding in
Gault appears to be limited to the actual hearing before the juvenile
court.43 Procedural due process and fairness would seem to require
that counsel be afforded the juvenile before the actual setting of
the date for the hearing. Even if the child should willingly admit
his guilt there remain the periods both before and after the hearing
during which the right to have counsel present would seem to be
fundamental. Gideon v. Wainwright,44 Escobedo v. Illinois, 4 and
Miranda v. Arizona46 have carried this reasoning into the criminal
courts and have compelled the appointment of counsel at the earliest
practical time-as soon as one is taken into custody and prior to
interrogation. Since this right has assumed constitutional dimen-
sions there seems to be no possible justification or plausible reason
for denying counsel to the juvenile at the same point in time when
counsel is granted to the adult. The right to counsel is without ques-
tion the most important right in any proceeding. Without this repre-
sentation all other rights lose their value. Furthermore it would
seem that with both his age and experience against him, the juve-
nile has even a greater need for counsel than does the adult. It seems
imperative that juveniles should have a right to counsel at the ear-
liest possible moment after they are taken into custody.
Second, a question arises as to why the Court saw fit to limit
the right to counsel to cases in which the juvenile may be institu-
tionalized and his freedom curtailed. Limiting the right to counsel
to such cases seems an unreasonable classification. The label of
"delinquency" attaches regardless of the offense and the life-long
stigma which all too often follows does not differentiate between
institutionalization and a different disposition. Therefore, it follows
that the necessity for counsel does not vary with the nature of the
offense and the right ought to extend to all cases which may result
in an adjudication of delinquency.47
A third inquiry is whether the juvenile is entitled to counsel
or to competent counsel. This issue is not unique to the juvenile
courts. With the growing frequency of representation in criminal
cases by court appointed counsel, the issue of the adequacy of repre-
43 As mentioned above, the scope of the holding may be broader than
it appears at first glance.
44 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
46 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
47 P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 192 (1st ed. 1944); Welch, Delin-
quency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in aQuasi-Criminal Forum, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 653, 670 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Welch]; Dembitz, supra note 2, at 512.
COMMENTS
sentation has arisen with greater frequency.49 Surely the juvenile
or the adult who is represented by court appointed counsel has a
right to genuine and effective representation.
(2) WAIVER
The Supreme Court held in Gault that the right to counsel,
appointed by the court if necessary, could be waived by the child
and his parents.49 It would appear that allowing this right to be
waived opens the door to the possibility of subtle manipulations
and pressures which may result in the juvenile, contrary to his own
best interests, waiving his right to counsel. In the District of Colum-
bia, where the juvenile's right to court appointed counsel has existed
for nearly a decade, in almost ninety percent of the cases parents and
juveniles "choose" to waive counsel.50 It seems fair to assume that
in some of these cases the juveniles were incapable of intelligently
weighing the need for counsel. Furthermore, it does not seem overly
harsh to conclude that in some cases the juveniles were coerced into
believing that they would be better off if they "went along."
If the new program of rights for juveniles is to be effective,
it must come to grips with the question of waiver-that is whether
a juvenile may ever be of sufficient maturity to knowingly, willingly
and intelligently waive his right to representation. One court has
stated, "it seems ... to follow as a matter of law that a boy of seven-
teen cannot competently waive his right to counsel in a criminal
case."51 Although the parent may be able to waive the right to
counsel, assuming no hostility exists between the parent and the
child, it has been argued that a youth may not waive the right on
his own behalf.52 The California Supreme Court, however, recently
upheld a minor's waiver of his right to remain silent and his right
to assistance of counsel which was made without the advice of an
attorney, parent or guardian.53
A number of courts have recognized the right of a criminal
defendant to waive his right to counsel and conduct his own de-
48 See, e.g., Entsminger v. State of Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Anders v.
State of California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Michele v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91 (1955).
49 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
50 Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of
Columbia at 646 (1966).
51 Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944). See also, McBride v.
Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1957); In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Mun.
App. D.C. 1953).
52 See In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 227-28 (D.D.C. 1955).
53 People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
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fense. 54 In addition, a number of state constitutions provide for the
right to waive counsel55 and this right exists in the federal courts56
as well. Several cases have gone so far as to state that this right is
absolute or unqualified.57 Yet, it is far from clear that the Federal
Constitution extends such an absolute right.
A number of cases indicate that waiver is a qualified right.
"More than the rights of an accused is involved in a criminal case."58
The fundamental basis for limiting the right to waive counsel is
society's interest in maintaining the integrity of the truth-determin-
ing process.59 If the defendant's right to represent himself jeopar-
dizes a fair trial of the issues or threatens society's interest in pro-
viding full protection for the rights of the accused, the right to waive
counsel may be restricted.60 Consequently, it has been firmly estab-
lished that the defendant may only waive his right to counsel if
he has an intelligent understanding of the consequences. 61 If the
defendant lacks a clear awareness of the consequences of his waiver,
he must be represented by counsel even if this is directly contrary
to his wishes.
The juvenile, limited by his age and inexperience, may not pos-
sess the maturity needed to assess the complex ramifications of pro-
ceeding without counsel. Although there are strong arguments for
protecting any individual's right to make a free choice as a free
man, it must be borne in mind that in juvenile courts the one who
stands to suffer from his improvident choice to reject counsel is
only a child. If our society sincerely intends to afford additional
54 United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). See generally, Note,
The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. REV.
1133 (1965).
55 For citations to provisions in 37 state constitutions, see United States
v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 275 & nn. 6-8 (2d Cir. 1964).
56 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1958).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 938 (2d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86(1948) (dictum).
58 Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
59 See Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 179 (1946).
60 Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 IVNX.
L. REv. 1133, 1137-47 (1965). See also, Note, Waiver of Constitutional
Rights by Minors: A Question of Law or Fact? 19 HAsmNGS L. J. 223
(1967).
61 See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160-62 (1957); Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
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protections to juveniles, every child accused of a crime should be
represented by competent counsel unless the judge, after a tho-
rough examination of all the relevant facts, concludes that the child
and his parents intelligently desire to waive this right.
B. UNANVswm QuEsTioNs
(1) ARREST AND SCREENING
If Gerald Gault had been an adult at the time of his confronta-
tion with the Arizona authorities, he could have been arrested only
if a warrant was first obtained or if his unlawful act was committed
in the presence of an officer.62 The Supreme Court of Arizona held
that this requirement was inapplicable in the case of juveniles and
the United States Supreme Court did not consider the issue.
This Arizona ruling represents the law in nearly every state.
Yet the stigma which may attach to any juvenile who acquires a
police record warrants the application of the laws of arrest to the
youthful offender. Such a stigma may have adverse effects upon
the child's future whether he is actually committed to an institu-
tion, placed on probation, warned or simply dismissed. Therefore,
the requirements of a lawful arrest are equally essential when deal-
ing with a child since he is still in his early years of development.
Furthermore, evidence or confessions obtained after an illegal ar-
rest are suppressed in an adult criminal proceeding.6 3 Surely the
requirement of a lawful arrest based on probably cause is a matter
of fundamental fairness and should be afforded to juveniles as well
as to adults.
A thorough study has been made of the screening process which
precedes the confrontation between the child and the juvenile court
judge.6 This process has been considered essential since so many
children are arrested each year. In 1959 for example, more than
500,000 children were arrested in cities of over 2,500 population.65
Consequently most juveniles who are taken into custody never see ajudge and forty-three percent of all children detained overnight or
longer 66 are released without ever being brought into a juvenile
court room. 67 The result of this screening process, by both the police
62 Am. REV. STAT. AxN. § 13-1403 (1956).
63 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
64 Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individual-
ized Justice, 79 HAuv. L. REV. 775 (1966).
65 U.S. DEP'T. OF JusTr E, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 99 (1960).
66 Children have been detained as long as six months while waiting for
disposition of their cases. White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
67 P. TAPPAN, JUVmuNIL DELINQUENcY 187 (1949).
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and the court's intake department, may be the creation of an official
record with either the police, the court, or both and possibly a sub-
stantial intereference with the child's liberty-all having developed
without constitutional or procedural safeguards. The police are gen-
erally free to disclose these records at their own discretion, thus in-
terfering with the child's future freedom as well. Informal sanctions
may be imposed during the screening process and this power is
obviously subject to abuse. Surely "a recognition of constitutional
rights seems imperative if children are being picked up with such
enthusiasm and kept for such periods without a hearing."68 It seems
clear that this crucial initial process of arrest and screening should
be regulated by statutes which provide for procedural safeguards.
Certain aspects of this problem have assumed constitutional dimen-
sions as a result of such cases as Miranda v. Arizona,69 providing for
counsel, and Ker v. California," requiring arrest by warrant or
probable cause. The protections which such cases make available
to adults should also be made available to juveniles.
(2) GRAND JURY INDICTMENT
Arraignment has long been considered an unnecessary proce-
dure in the juvenile courts. The reasoning has been that since the
juvenile is not being charged with a crime, arraignment would be of
no value. In fact, not all states provide a constitutional right to
indictment or presentment by a grand jury as a prerequisite to crim-
inal prosecutions. Although the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides for indictment "for a capital or other-
wise infamous crime," the United States Supreme Court held in
Hurtado v. California71 that such an indictment is only necessary in
state courts if the right is contained in the state's constitution.
Otherwise, prosecution may be commenced on an information filed
by the prosecuting attorney. Such states will not be willing to pro-
vide for a grand jury indictment in juvenile cases when they do not
make such a provision in adult cases. In states which do have a
constitutional grand jury clause, the cases are in conflict as to
whether that right applies in the case of a juvenile.72 Since the
"information" meets the requirements of fairness and Gault pro-
vides for specific allegations and adequate notice, it appears that
68 Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387,
388 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Antieau].
69 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
70 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
71 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
72 See State ex tel. Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914).
But see, Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643 (1915).
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the grand jury issue will be of lesser importance in the debate over
fundamental rights.
(3) BAIL
In recent years close attention has been directed to the problems
of bail and pre-trial detention of adults. 73 The primary criticism of
the bail system is that it is but another sanctioned means of dis-
criminating against the poor who are unable to exercise this right.
Bail has also been criticized on the grounds that it is subject to
abuse and arbitrariness by the judge. In short, better standards are
needed so that this right may be guaranteed to all. Although the im-
perfections of the present system have been challenged, little atten-
tion has been given to the same problem in juvenile cases, where this
right, albeit imperfect, is generally denied.
The United States Constitution does not expressly grant a right
to bail, but the Eighth Amendment provides that excessive bail shall
not be required. 74 Federal law has long maintained that in all but
capital cases, 75 a person accused of a crime has an absolute right to
be admitted to bail.76 The same right is guaranteed in all but seven
states.77
Prior to the enactment of the juvenile court statutes this same
right extended to children accused of a crime. In fact today, if the
juvenile's case is waived to a criminal court, the right to bail exists.
The right, however, is not absolute in most juvenile court systems
and is in fact denied in the majority. Some states expressly permit
bail for juveniles and others expressly deny it. Twenty-seven states
have no provision dealing with the question. In these latter jurisdic-
tions only a few cases exist on the subject and those cases which
have been decided are in conflict.78
The proponents of an absolute right to bail79 argue that there is
no basis for denying this right simply because the child is in a juve-
73 See, e.g., P. WALD & D. FREED, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964 (1964),
and the projects enumerated therein.
74 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excesive fine imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIHI.
75 In capital cases the right to bail is discretionary.
76 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
77 P. WALD & D. FREED, BAL iN THE UNITED STATES: 1964 2, n.8 (1964).
78 See, e.g., In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952);
A.N.E. v. State, 156 So. 2d 525 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1963). But see
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Franklin, 202
La. 439, 12 So. 2d 211 (1943).
79 Antieau, supra note 68, at 393-94.
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nile court. Since these tribunals were designed with the view of
showing more consideration to the juvenile, there can be no justifi-
cation for an absolute denial of this right in juvenile courts if the
right is provided for in the criminal court. Even though in certain
cases the parents may not be an ideal custodian for the child,
"... until the hearing is held and the juvenile court makes its dispo-
sition, it is urged that the child belongs in his home and not in a
police lock-up, a county jail, or even a 'detention center.'"80 The
argument for an absolute right to bail in the juvenile courts is but-
tressed by the present general inadequacy of detention facilities. In
fact, "youngsters not at all delinquent when picked up may well
be deviants after such 'care' by the state before it is ready to try
them or return them to their homes and families."8'
On the other hand it has been argued that there should not
be an absolute right to bail as this would be inconsistent with the
basic policy of the juvenile courts which seek to provide a juvenile
coming within their purview with the care and guidance most con-
ducive to his welfare. 82 Opponents of an absolute right to bail con-
tend that there are many cases in which release might be potentially
detrimental to the welfare of the child.88 The judge should be
allowed to determine whether the needs of the juvenile and the
society would best be served by release or detention. The advocates
of this position recognize that many problems exist in managing
this selective process, the most basic being a lack of funds. In many
instances, due to a lack of adequately trained personnel, no consid-
ered determination is or can be made and if it were, the judge's
alternatives may be very limited. Many jurisdictions have no deten-
tion facilities for juveniles and it becomes a choice between jail
detention and release. As a result, the judge's decision is often arbi-
trary and wrong.
A thoughtful proposal for developing workable and just screen-
ing centers has been made.8 4 Talent, concern and finances would
80 Id. at 394.
81 Id. at 387-88.
82 This position is taken by the Standard Juvenile Court Act. STAN-
DARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 17(6).
83 Paulsen makes this point in his article with these examples; "see,
for example, In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So. 2d 466 (1954), which
tells of a young girl who had sexual relations with a man in 'her
mother's bed at her home in New Orleans, with her mother's apparent
consent and approval,' and Application of Jones, 206 Misc. 557, 134
N.Y.S.2d 90 (1954), which tells of a fifteen year old who had been
abused by her stepfather." Paulsen, supra note 16, at 552 n.21.
84 Legislation, The Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial" Detention of Juve-
niles Accused of "Crime," 18 VAND. L. REv. 2096, 2108-09 (1965).
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be needed to implement such a process and there is little evidence
of reform. Consequently, whether one believes in providing an abso-
lute right to bail in juvenile courts or not, it is clear that a state
should not be permitted to grant the right to bail to an adult and
absolutely deny the right to a juvenile.
(4) TRIAL BY JURY
Presently, there is no federal constitutional right to trial by
jury in state courts and this, of course, includes the juvenile courts.
This decision was first reachced in the case of Maxwell v. Dow 5 and
has been frequently reaffirmed, the most famous opinion perhaps
being that of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut.8 How-
ever, nearly every state has adopted a guarantee of the right to a
jury trial in a criminal case. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
a right to trial by jury is applicable to criminal proceedings in the
federal courts. But the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act8 7 pro-
vides the juvenile with an option; he may choose between a juvenile
proceeding or a criminal proceeding and if he selects the former he
has waived his right to a trial by jury.
Relying on the long prevailing theory that juvenile court pro-
ceedings are non-criminal, most of the state courts that have ruled
on the issue have concluded that the right to a jury trial is not
applicable in juvenile courts.88 This view has been reaffirmed since
Gault by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.8 9 The court concluded
that trial by jury is not an essential element of due process and that
if it were required in juvenile court proceedings it would have an
adverse effect upon the ability of the juvenile court to fulfill its
unique function. On the other hand, the New Mexico Supreme
Court has recently ruled 0 that since the state statute91 provides for
85 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
86 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See also, Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The
Court is hearing a case asking for incorporation of the right to a jury
trial into the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. State, No. 410, 0. T.
1967.
87 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1964). After completion of this article this provision
of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was declared unconstitutional.
Nieves v. U.S.,--F.Supp.-(S.D. N.Y. 1968).
88 People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955); Hampton
v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953); In re Gomez, 113 Vt.
224, 32 A.2d 138 (1943); Laurie v. State, 108 Neb. 239, 188 N.W. 110
(1922). But see, State v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952).
89 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967).
90 Peyton v. Nord, 36 U.S.L.W. 2262 (N.M. Oct. 16, 1967).
91 N.M. STAT. ANx. § 13-8-26 (1953). Nebraska's statute is similar. See
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-201 (Reissue 1960).
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juvenile court jurisdiction over a juvenile "who has violated any
law" the child must first be found guilty of the violation before
jurisdiction attaches. Consequently, the right to a trial by jury,
which is guaranteed by the state, is applicable to the juvenile.
With the majority of decisions to the contrary, few of the critics
of the juvenile court process have urged the adoption of the right to
trial b r jury.9 2 It is contended that a jury trial would not be in
the interests of the juvenile and would be contrary to the objectives
of the juvenile court acts.93 These arguments may be valid as long
as the judge is willing to carefully consider the determination of
delinquency before considering disposition.
Again, the majority of states are depriving the juvenile of a
right which is afforded an adult accused of the same crime. Again,
the juvenile's rights are diminished instead of enlarged. Whether
this denial will remain acceptable is therefore open to question. A
possible solution to this problem is found in Massachusetts. In
Massachusetts, after the juvenile is convicted in the juvenile court,
he may appeal to the superior court in which he will receive a trial
de novo with full adult protections, including a jury trial.9 4
(5) SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL
The United States Supreme Court recently held in Klopfer v.
North Carolina95 "that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental
as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment."9 6 Therefore,
the Court concluded that this right applied to the state courts by
way of the Fourteenth Amendment. It appears clear that this hold-
ing is applicable to the juvenile courts as well as the criminal courts.
Earlier state court decisions operating on the usual theory that
juvenile proceedings are non-criminal, have ruled that the right to
a speedy trial under state constitutional safeguards is inapplicable.97
As indicated above, juveniles have been held for long periods of time
without being brought to trial.98 No possible justification can be
thought of for denying the right to a speedy trial in juvenile pro-
92 But see, Antieau, supra note 68, at 400-01.
93 Welch, supra note 47, at 691.
94 MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 119 § 56 (1958).
95 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
96 Id. at 223.
97 E.g., Matter of Mont. 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).
98 See note 66 supra. The tactics of delay, detention and denial of bail
have also been used as a means of harassing juveniles involved in civil
rights demonstrations. See, Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juve-
nile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Quick].
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ceedings. The same reasons which have warranted the guarantee
of this right to adults in criminal courts are equally applicable to
children in juvenile courts. No juvenile should be forced to live
with the stigma which attaches to the criminally accused while wait-
ing a lengthy period for an actual adjudication of his guilt. Nor
should the threat of a loss of liberty indefinitely hang over the juve-
nile's head. It is submitted that the right to a speedy trial is abso-
lutely essential to fundamental due process and fairness and having
been held applicable to the states, this right must be granted in a
juvenile proceeding.
In In re Olive9 9 the Supreme Court held that the requirement
of a public trial is a right guaranteed by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus binding upon the state
courts. Forty-one states guarantee this right in their state constitu-
tions and others have provided this right by statute or judicial deci-
sion. Yet, this right has frequently been limited or denied in the
juvenile courts. Such a restriction has arisen both by judicial deci-
sions 0 0 and by statutes.' 0 1
Juvenile court hearings are usually held in private with the
general public excluded. Some critics have contended that this
policy is similar to the procedure of the Star Chamber. The denial
of this right has been supported on the grounds that it affords addi-
tional protection to the juvenile; he is not exposed to the gaze of
the community. It is also urged that an open trial might have a
traumatic psychological effect on the juvenile. Others contend that
publicity may have a therapeutic effect on both the child and the
public 02
Avoiding notoriety may be a laudable objective but the fair
trial concept inherent in due process of law demands that a child
be given a public trial if he so desires. Public trials have been
considered necessary if one is to be protected from abuse of judicial
authority. This right provides a healthy check upon the judge.
Since the scope of the juvenile court judge's powers have always
been broader than that of a criminal court judge and since he is not
required to comply with all the standards and procedures which
99 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
100 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn.
70, 121 A. 678 (1923); State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d 242 (1951);
Matter of Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).
101 See e.g., STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 19 and CAL. WEL-
FARE & INST'NS. CODE § 676 (Supp. 1964).
102 Symposium, The Public's Right to Know, 5 N.P.P.A.J. 431 (1959) which
sets forth the transcript of a debate on this question at a meeting of
the National Institute on Crime and Delinquency, Swampscott, Mass.,
June 1, 1959.
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restrict the criminal court judge, it would seem that this check
would be even more essential in the juvenile court system.
Furthermore, the juvenile courts are the public's business. The
public's apathy toward the system is probably due in part to the
secrecy of the proceedings. Some juvenile courts admit reporters
if they do not publish the juvenile's name or any identifying details.
This rule improves the community's understanding of the juvenile
court and provides for an objective check upon the judge's use of
authority.103
The best answer, one which meets the needs of fundamental
fairness, would be to inform the juvenile and his counsel of the
juvenile's right to a public trial and allow that right to be waived
if so desired.104 To really protect the child accused of a crime, the
accused, with the guidance of counsel, should be allowed to deter-
mine if he wishes to dispense with the right to a public trial.
(6) HEARSAY EVIDENCE
When it decided the Gault case below, the Supreme Court of
Arizona held that the juvenile court judge could consider hearsay
if it was "of a kind on which reasonable men are accustomed to rely
in serious affairs."'1 5 The United States Supreme Court indicated
no opinion as to whether or not this decision conflicts with the re-
quirements of the Federal Constituion.106
The informality of juvenile court hearings and the belief that
such proceedings are non-criminal has often led to the admission of
hearsay tesitmony. It has been contended that "close adherence to
the strict rules of evidence might prevent the court from obtaining
important facts as to the child's character and condition which
could only be to the child's detriment."'07 Furthermore, it is argued
that the judge will give this normally inadmissable evidence limited
weight and that he can distinguish valid evidence from untrust-
worthy evidence. 0 8 Yet, even a judge may have difficulty in ascer-
taining the credibility of a hearsay statement.
103 See generally, Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 101 (1957).
104 Antieau, supra note 68, at 399. But see Blanton, Juvenile Courts and
the Constitutional Rights of Minors, 18 THE ALA. LAWYER 12, 22-23
(1957).
105 Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, - , 407 P.2d 760, 768 (1965).
106 Inre Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 11 & n. 7 (1967).
107 Whitlatch, Practice and Procedure in the Juvenile Court, 21 CLEVE-
LAND B.A.J. 118 (1950).
108 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); also
cf. Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?
79 HARV. L. REV. 407 (1965).
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The admissability of hearsay evidence has, not surprisingly,
been subject to stern criticism. Some children have even been
adjudicated delinquent solely on the basis of hearsay. In the famou
Holmes case,10 9 the judge allowed a detective to testify that a boy
had participated in a robbery on the basis of a "confession" of
another boy. Neither the confessor nor the "confession" was seen
by the court. The boy who made the "confession" later repudiated
it, but Holmes was adjudicated a delinquent. Fortunately, the ma-
jority of jurisdictions do hold that strict rules of evidence are applic-
able in juvenile courts and these jurisdictions are supported by con-
vincing authority.11 0
It can only be concluded that "hearsay, rumors, gossip, ex parte
reports by persons not sworn in court, etc., have no more place in
juvenile court proceedings than in any other judicial hearing.""'"
There is no justification for discriminating between the child and
the adult, as the rules of evidence have a sound basis in human ex-
perience and should be considered fundamental in any judicial
inquiry which may result in a loss of freedom.
(7) ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
The question of the admissability in a juvenile court of illegally-
obtained evidence remains undecided. In the case of Mapp v.
Ohio,11"2 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution bars the use
of illegally-obtained evidence in state criminal proceedings as well
as in federal courts. Thus the Fourth Amendment's protection
"against unreasonable searches and seizures" applies to the state
courts. Clearly this exclusionary rule should be extended to the
juvenile courts. 1 13 In a recent decision, a New Jersey Superior Court
held the Mapp rule applicable in a juvenile proceeding." 4 There is
no justification for dispensing with the Fourth Amendment and
allowing the police unrestricted zeal simply because the suspect is
a juvenile.
(8) STANDARD OF PROOF
Relying on the theory that the court is a civil court, the juvenile
courts generally require only a preponderance of the evidence in
109 In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
110 In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954); People v. Lewis, 260
N.Y. 171, 177, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932); Antieau, supra note 68, at 401
& 411; WELcH, supra note 47, at 684.
111 Antieau, supra note 68, at 411.
112 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11" See Quick, supra note 98, at 95-98.
14 State v. Lowry, 49 N.J. 476, 231 A.2d 361 (1967).
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order to prove delinquency.115 One court has reaffirmed this view
since Gault,116 while another has recognized the criminal nature of
the proceedings and has required that all allegations be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.117 A compromise has been proposed:
An attractive solution to evidentiary problems of the juvenile court
in the majority of its cases may be to require clear and convincing
proof, which the lawbooks denote as more than a preponderance
of evidence but less than proof beyond doubt demanded in criminal
procedure. Clear and convincing proof is the highest order of civil
evidence, which admits of only one reasonable conclusion."&
However, it is still frequently maintained that such caution is
unnecessary since the juvenile is not being punished but rehabili-
tated. This argument insists that "the criminal law test should be
confined to criminal prosecutions.""19
Although the nature (criminal or non-criminal) of the juvenile
proceedings remains in doubt, it is the author's opinion that since
committing a child to an institution is unquestionably a deprivation
of his liberty, juvenile court objectives cannot justify finding a
juvenile "guilty" of a violation of the criminal law on less evidence
than if he were an adult.
(9) MENS REA
Our criminal law has long recognized the requirement of a
mental element in most crimes. This principle has been expressed
"actus non facit reum nisi mens sit tea." (An act does not make a
person guilty unless his intention be guilty also).120 This essential
element of a crime has had a confusing but interesting history, but
the necessity for some mental element has not been seriously chal-
lenged for centuries.
Mens rea, however, is largely ignored in the juvenile courts.12 1
Frequently juvenile delinquency statutes speak in terms of violating
15 United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957); People v.
Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied 289 U.S. 709(1933); Bryant v. Brown, 151 MViss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928).
116 In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
117 In re Urbasek, 76 Ili. App.2d 375, 222 N.E.2d 233 (1967). See also In re
Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946).
118 Task Force, supra note 13, Appendix D, Lemert, The Juvenile Court-
Quest and Realities, 91, 103.
119 Paulsen, supra note 16, at 563.
120 Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889)
121 The question of criminal responsibility of juveniles is discussed in
Docket No. 27-220-J, Juvenile Court for the District of Columbia,(opinion delivered Oct. 20, 1959) (unpublished); People v. Roper, 259
N.Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88 (1932).
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laws and many of these laws require a requisite mens rea. There-
fore, mens rea should clearly be an issue in the juvenile courts and
the defenses which are inherent in this concept should be made
available to the juvenile.
Mens rea would be of lesser importance in the juvenile courts
since the concept is often used in the criminal courts in order to
determine the degree of punishment. In the juvenile courts, the
disposition made by the judge has no necessary relation to the crime
committed. This is no justification for totally abandoning this funda-
mental requirement for "the concept of mens rea fills a significant
need and cannot be disregarded without raising serious questions to
which there are no ready-made answers. "122
Furthermore, fundamental fairness would seem to require that:
[M]ens rea should be viewed as an objective criteria which must be
satisfied before a violation of certain statutory or common law
offenses is shown. As such, it is a protection to the rights of thejuvenile, something which should be of vital concern to every judge
of a juvenile court.123
(10) TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS
The right to a transcript of the juvenile proceedings was an
issue presented to the Supreme Court in Gault on which it did not
rule. Most juvenile courts do not provide for transcripts of their
proceedings. Some courts provide a transcript but indigents are
still unable to receive them. Since any appeal would be only as
effective as the record upon which it is based, records of the pro-
ceedings are essential. Provisions should exist for the recording of
a court hearing as an automatic right in any juvenile court pro-
ceeding.124 An indigent juvenile should have a right to a copy of
this record without cost. Such requirements have been objected to
on the grounds that formalism would be increased, added personnel
would be required, and costs would be excessive. Mechanical re-
cording, however, as proposed by the Standard Juvenile Court Act
would avoid these problems.
In theory juvenile court proceedings were to remain confidential
so that no stigma would attach to children who confronted the
court. For this same reason a child guilty of a crime was to be
labeled "delinquent" not "criminal." These procedures have failed
to avoid the attaching of a stigma to the guilty child and neither is
a valid reason for not having all juvenile court proceedings recorded.
122 Westbook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. OF FAMIy LAW 121,
135 (1965).
123 Id. at 138.
124 E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 677 (1961).
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Most juvenile court statutes require, but fail to define, "confi-
dential" records, and discretion is left to the judge to weigh the
factors in favor of disclosure or non-disclosure of the juvenile's
record. Consequently, practices throughout the country and even
within a given state vary; some judges enforce complete non-disclo-
sure and others allow broad disclosure.125
Procedures for expunging records are available in only a few
jurisdictions. In addition, it remains an open question as to the
effect of expunging the records-may the individual now respond to
inquiries by stating that he has never had any contact with the
police or the courts? Even if the judge demands non-disclosure, the
police may release their records. Perhaps any criticism of these
inconsistent procedures is worthless since it is clear that our society
attaches a stigma to the juvenile who comes into significant contact
with authorities regardless of the result of the adjudication. Estab-
lishing a system in which this confrontation remains totally confl-
dential seems impossible and yet it is clear that the existing means
of controlling records are inconsistent and inadequate. In order to
allow the juvenile to suffer as little as possible from his mistake,
a uniform system should be developed with a maximum of non-
disclosure of court records.
(11) DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Protection against double jeopardy is provided for in the Con-
stitution of the United States126 and guaranteed by most states to
adults accused of a crime. Most state courts, however, presently
maintain that this defense is not applicable in the case of a juvenile
being tried in a criminal court for the same offense which was pre-
viously adjudicated in a juvenile court. 2 7 Again the customary
explanation is that this protection is provided only in the defense
of a criminal case and that juvenile proceedings are non-criminal.
Following this approach, juveniles have been institutionalized for
as long as fifteen months and then prosecuted for the same offense
in a criminal court! 28
125 Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individual-
ized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 799-801 (1966).
•126 "[n]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb,..." U.S. CONST. amend. V. (emphasis
added).
127 People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re
Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
128 People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953). See
Sheridan, Double Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Pro-
ceedings, 23 FED. PROB. 43 (1959).
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The Supreme Court has not incorporated this Fifth Amendment
ban upon double jeopardy into the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, so as to impose it upon the states. But Mr.
Justice Black, discussing the ban upon double jeopardy in a dis-
senting opinion, stated: "Few principles have been more deeply
'rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people.' ")129
Denying to children the protection of a tradition which is con-
sidered an essential element of fundamental fairness in most adult
cases is unsatisfactory. Some states have adopted this view,8 0 but
the majority continue to deny this right. Surely this safeguard
cannot be disregarded by the simple expedient of manipulating the
labels which are affixed to the nature of the proceedings. This con-
clusion has been ably made by the statement that:
Ineluctable logic leads to the conclusion that the constitutional pro-
tection against double jeopardy.., is applicable to all proceedings,
irrespective of whether they are denominated criminal or civil, if
the outcome may be deprivation of liberty of the person. Neces-
sarily, therefore, this is true of proceedings in the Juvenile Court.
Precious constitutional rights cannot be diminished or whittled
away by the device of changing names of tribunals or modifying the
nomenclature of legal proceedings. The test must be the nature
and the essence of the proceeding rather than its title. If the result
may be a loss of personal liberty, the constitutional safeguards
apply.131
All states should guarantee this right. Those that already make
such a guarantee to an adult should afford the same protection to
juveniles.
(12) CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
As was indicated before, the Arizona juvenile court ordered
Gerald Gault, aged 15, committed to the State Industrial School
until he should reach his majority. An adult convicted of the same
offense, after a trial incorporating all procedural due process guar-
antees, would have been subject to a fine of $5 to $50 and imprison-
ment for not more than two months. Gault's period of confinement
was not novel, as juvenile courts have frequently been permitted
to commit children for far longer terms than an adult could be
sentenced for the same act.132 In fact, the disposition made by the
:129 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
130 Matter of Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); Van Hatten v.
State, 97 Tex. Crim. 123, 260 S.W. 581 (1924).
'3' United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd,
271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
132 Ex parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 P. 9 (1896); People v. Scherbing,
93 Cal. App. 736, 209 P.2d 796 (1949); Commonwealth v. Fischer, 123
Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905); State v. Cagle, 111 S.C. 548, 96 S.E. 291 (1918).
584 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 3 (1968)
juvenile court judge has no necessary relation to the offense com-
mitted and obviously, the younger the offender, the longer he may
be committed.
As previously stated, state facilities for juveniles are generally
grossly inadequate and efforts at rehabilitation usually fail. Con-
sequently, in the author's opinion, an indefinite commitment of a
juvenile to a state institution may be contested on the grounds that
it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Such commitments
have been defended on grounds that the child is not being punished
and that reformation cannot be accomplished in any definite period
of time. Courts have declared that such an indefinite term of con-
finement is not a denial of due process, or of equal protection by the
law, or a cruel and unusual punishment. 133 In Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 3 4 the Supreme Court assumed that the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments in the Eighth Amendment had been incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment by Francis v. Resweber.135
Thus the question of cruel and unusual punishments has assumed
constitutional dimensions. Such discrimination between a child and
an adult cannot be tolerated when no evidence exists as to the suc-
cess of such indefinite commitments. Denying a child his liberty
for six years constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment when an
adult found guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the same offense
may be denied of his liberty for no more than two months.
(13) RIGHT TO APPEAL
The right to appellate review was another of the issues pre-
sented to the Supreme Court in Gault on which it did not rule.13
In fact, the Supreme Court has not held that a state is required by
the Federal Constitution "to provide appellate courts or a right to
appellate review at all."'31 7 However, most states have a constitu-
tional provision or a statute which grants this right to adults.
Generally the juvenile court system has operated without any
appellate surveillance. Juvenile court procedures prior to Gault
reduced the value of an appeal. Without an attorney or a court
record little basis for an appeal can be established. Although the
juvenile is now afforded the right to counsel, the problem of tran-
scripts remains unresolved. Some states do provide the right of
133 Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931); Ex parte Birch-
field, 90 Okla. Crim. 197, 212 P.2d 145, 148 (1949).
134 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
135 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
136 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
137 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
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appeal, but by and large the judgment of a juvenile court has been
questioned only collaterally by way of habeas corpus. A study in
New York revealed that in 1959 and 1960 only four cases were
reviewed by appellate courts although nearly 20,000 children were
adjudicated delinquent or neglected in the Children's Court of the
City of New York!138 It is submitted that lack of appellate review is
not only a denial of the juvenile's right to equal treatment, but
that in fact the juvenile courts have suffered from this lack of super-
vision. The President's Commission reported that denial of appellate
review had adversely affected the quality of justice in several ways:
First, there has been no appellate forum to rectify errors and injust-
ices in particular cases. Second, the system has been deprived of
the kind of sustained examination and formulation of law and
policy that appellate review can provide. Third, it has not been
possible to develop, through appellate review, uniform application
of the law throughout a State. 89
It seems clear that a right to appeal should be an element of
the juvenile court process; statutes guaranteeing this right are
needed. It has been suggested that:
Perhaps it would be best to provide for a full transcript of the pro-
ceedings, require the judge to state his conclusion of act and law,
suspend the treatment pending appeal, and expedite appeal so that
treatment will not be excessively delayed if the appeal proves
unsuccessful.140
(14) RETROACTIVITY
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gault does not discuss whether
the holding should be given a retroactive application. Two courts
have ruled on this issue since Gault and they have reached opposite
conclusions.' 41
The Supreme Court has stated that; "the choice between retro-
activity and nonretroactivity in no way turns on the value of the
constitutional guarantee involved.... We do not disparage a con-
stitutional guarantee in any manner by declining to apply it retro-
actively." 42 Furthermore:
We also stress that the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a rule
is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitu-
138 See Schinitsky, The Role of the Lawyer in the Children's Court, 17
REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 10, 15 (1962).
139 Task Force, supra note 13, at 40.
140 Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individual-
ized Justice, 79 HAuv. L. REv. 775, 799 (1966)
141 Marsden v. Commonwealth, - Mass. - , 227 N.E.2d 1 (1967), retro-
active, Rieck v. Hershman, 35 U.S.L.W. 2754 (Wis. June 1, 1967), not
retroactive.
142 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966).
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tion on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of
criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own back-
ground of precedent, and its own impact on the administration ofjustice, and the way in whch these factors combine must inevitably
vary with the dictate involved.143
Thus the Supreme Court has held that the question of retro-
activity is to be determined in each case by examining the peculiar
traits of the specific "rule in question." Under this test, the Court
has in fact reached a different result in different cases. Johnson v.
New Jersey'" held that Eccobedo 45 and Miranda146 were not to
be applied retroactively. In Linkletter v. Walker 47 the Court held
that the rule in Mapp,'14 excluding evidence obtained through an
unreasonable search and seizure from state criminal proceedings,
was not to be given retroactive application. Likewise in Tehan v.
Shott,149 the Court held that the rule in Griffin,150 which forbade
prosecutors and judges in a state criminal trial from commenting
adversely on the defendant's failure to testify, was not retroactive.
On the other hand, the right of an indigent to counsel established in
Gideon,151 and the exclusion of an involuntary confession from trial
developed in Jackson v. Denno,1 52 were given retroactive effect.
As to these latter two cases, the Court stated that; "in each instance
we concluded that retroactive application was justified because the
rule 'affected the very integrity of the fact-finding process' and
averted 'the clear danger of convicting the innocent.' "' 3
The decision in Gideon was actually applied retrospectively
since the lower court's judgment was attacked collaterally by post-
conviction remedies. The Gideon decision would seem to be highly
relevant to the question of whether Gault is to be applied retro-
actively. First, Gideon dealt with the right of an accused adult
indigent to court appointed counsel and the granting of a right to
counsel to juveniles is the key holding in Gault. Second, Gault
attacked the juvenile court's decision collaterally by way of habeas
corpus after he had already been committed to the Arizona State
143 Id. at 728.
144 384 U.S. 719 (1966)
145 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
146 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
147 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
148 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
149 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
150 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
151 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
152 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
153 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1966).
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Industrial School. It would appear to this author that since Gideon
was given a retroactive application, Gault may also be applied retro-
actively, at least as to the issue of the right to counsel. But there
are certain distinctions between the retroactivity problem arising
from Gideon and that arising from Gault. The states did place
greater reliance on not having to furnish counsel in juvenile courts
than they did in adult criminal cases prior to Gideon.
It has been suggested that the trend toward a prospective appli-
cation of newly recognized constitutional procedural rights will
probably be maintained in Gault when the issue is ultimately
resolved by the Supreme Court. 54
IlI. LEGAL ETHICS
Despite the "privilege" of waiver, it appears certain that attor-
neys will now be entering the juvenile court process in increasing
numbers. They will be confronted with perplexing questions of
procedure 55 and legal ethics.
Upon entering a juvenile court case the attorney must imme-
,diately confront and resolve two basic issues which have unlimited
xamifications in the area of legal ethics:
A. To whom does the attorney owe his obligation?
B. What is the nature of that obligation?
-A. DUTY TO WHOM?
The Supreme Court concluded in Gault that the child and the
parent have the right to legal representation for the child. 5 6 Thus,
the possibility of conflicting interests is apparent. Canon 6 of the
,Canons of Professional Ethics indicates that an attorney may not
represent conflicting interests. Therefore, it seems obvious that in
,certain situations an attorney should not represent both the child
and the parents. An early determination of the possibility of con-
flict is essential, for once the attorney attempts to represent both
154 Dorsen and Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1
FAMLY L.Q. 1, 29 (1967).
155 As pointed out in Part II supra, although the similarities of juvenile
proceedings to criminal prosecutions since Gault have increased, the
proceedings retain much of their sui generis character. Thus the
troublesome questions of how to proceed will be of immediate concern
to the attorney. The proper role of the attorney will largely have
to be formed by experience. The lawyer will need to acquire an
understanding of the aims and ever-changing methods of the juve-
nile court if he is to successfully serve his client, the court and society.
The law schools and bar associations will have to assume greater
responsibility in this area.
-156 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 40 (1967).
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and a conflict develops, total withdrawal may represent the attor-
ney's only way out of the dilemma.
This problem will first arise when the court attempts to deter-
mine whether the right to counsel is desired. The juvenile court
judge could inquire only of the parent whether the right is to be
waived. Obviously when the parent is openly hostile to the child,
perhaps having even instituted the proceedings, such a procedure
by the judge would be indefensible. Additionally, there are many
possible conflicts between parent and child that are not readily
apparent. Hence the judge should always base his decision on the
needs of the child alone.
Once the right to counsel is granted, the attorney must per-
sonally come to grips with this issue. He must look for possible
conflicts of interest. One example of conflicting interest between
parent and child would be when the child wishes to admit his guilt
but the parents seek to resist jurisdiction which might result in the
court preempting their right to custody. Another possibility is that
the parents may seek to retain custody even when they are neglect-
ing or abusing the child. The case may be a matter of parental
neglect and the child's best defense would be to have proceedings
instituted against the parents. On the other hand the child might
seek to avoid custody by the state, while the parents want to be
relieved of their responsibility for the child. Such possibilities for
conflict, and there are probably many more, must be considered
by the attorney. He must examine the facts and ascertain to the
best of his ability the possibilities for adverse interests between
the parent and the child. As long as the slightest doubt exists as
to their unity of interest, the attorney should make it clear that
the child's interests alone will guide the course of his representation.
The attorney should then insist that the parents retain separate
counsel if they desire representation. It is the child who is accused
of an illegal act and it is the child alone who is in jeopardy of losing
his liberty. Consequently, if the right to counsel is to meaningful,
the attorney's duty must be first and foremost to the child. The
attorney must recognize this obligation at the outset in order to
immediately avoid all possible conflicts with that duty.
B. WHAT DuTY?
Once the attorney establishes a relationship which will permit
him to serve the child's interest alone, he must confront the more
perplexing question-that is, the extent of his obligation to the
juvenile. The question is whether the attorney's obligation to the
juvenile is the same as his responsibility to an adult accused of a
crime in the criminal courts.
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This fundamental issue is not resolved by the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics, as they simply were not drafted with juvenile
courts in mind. Many references to "civil" and "criminal" cases may
not be applicable-since the nature of juvenile proceedings remains
in doubt.157 In fact, the Canons have been frequently criticized for
failing to sufficiently guide the attorney in the criminal court. 5
Nevertheless, the Canons coupled with the attorney's conscience,
are to date the extent of his sources for resolving the issue.
It might be suggested that an attorney's usual loyalty to his
client, and the client's natural desire to avoid punishment are inap-
propriate in a juvenile court. Assuming the net result will be a
benefit to the child, this line of reasoning might conclude that the
lawyer's responsibilities are vastly different in the juvenile court.
If one assumes that the attorney's obligation to a juvenile is
somehow different than his duty to an adult, difficult problems will
arise. The attorney's experience and pattern of behavior will have
to be altered and this will not be a simple task, particularly since
presently such alterations will have to be largely self-imposed.
Defenders of the pre-Gault juvenile court system may urge that
the attorney recognize that the primary goal of this system is to
assist the child in his development and that therefore many of the
defensive tactics used in a criminal court should be forgotten. It
has been urged that the attorney should disclose all information
which comes to his attention, even if such facts will result in an
adjudication of delinquency. 59 The success, however, of rehabilita-
tive efforts is now seriously questioned. Moreover, Canon 37 pro-
hibits divulging confidential communications. Others fear that attor-
neys may urge their client to claim the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.10 Such advice to a juvenile client would now be consistant
with due process. Furthermore, Canon 15 requires "warm zeal" in
defense of the client's rights. Also, Canon 5, in criminal cases, im-
157 The Canons of Professional Ethics are currently being revised by a
special committee of the American Bar Association. It is intended that
a new Code of Professional Responsibility will be presented to the
A.B.A. House of Delegates for its consideration in February of 1969.
For a preview of the new code see, Sutton, A Preview of the Proposed
Code of Professional Responsibility, 53 A.B.A.J. 901 (1967). This article
unfortunately gives no indication that the problem will be specifically
resolved but does indicate that the new code will be a modern state-
ment "of the lawyer's professional responsibilities in the light of the
present structure and development of the profession.
158 See, e.g., Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense
Personnel: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 Amv. CRnm. L.Q. 28 (1966).
159 See NATIONAL COUNCm ON CRniE AND DELINQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE, IN THE JUVENILE COURT 43 (1962). See also, Dembitz, supra
note 2, at 511.
160 See Lefstein, supra note 22, at 812.
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plores the attorney "to present every defense that the law of the
land permits."
Some specific problems might be considered. If the child ada-
mantly maintains his innocence, the attorney should obviously pre-
sent a zealous defense. But what is the attorney to do when he is
convinced that the allegations are true and that the child needs
treatment, but the child wants to resist? What should he do when
the child privately admits his guilt but, by having the child remain
silent, the attorney can obtain a dismissal?
These problems are complicated enough when defending an
adult, but some have urged that in such juvenile cases the attorney
should admit the allegations over the child's objections. However,
if the attorney dispenses with the delinquency hearing despite his
client's wishes, the juvenile has not been afforded the right to legal
representation; rather the attorney has merely set himself up as
another parens partiae.161
Despite the present inadequacies of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, it is clear that in these suggested cases the attorney has an
obligation to represent the juvenile's legitimate interests. If the
attorney does not so act but concedes the child's guilt, he has per-
sonally denied the child his right to due process of law.
Furthermore, since the ultimate goal of the juvenile court
process is to rehabilitate the child as far as possible, fairness in the
adjudicatory process seems extremely important. The attitude with
which the juvenile leaves the courtroom will be singularly impor-
tant. What methods will best foster a favorable attitude remains
an open question. Some contend that if the lawyer succeeds in get-
ting the juvenile "off" when he is actually guilty, the youth will
only be encouraged to commit more illegal acts. 162 Others contend
that the juvenile will have more respect for the legal system if he
knows that he was fully and fairly represented. 6 3 The latter argu-
ment seems more valid. If the youth feels that he has been deceived
by the juvenile court and by his attorney,'64 he would be more
161 For an excellent discussion of this problem see, Welch, supra note 47,
at 680.
162 See, e.g., Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46
A.B.A.J. 1206 (1960); Molloy, Juvenile Court-A Labyrinth of Confu-
sion for the Lawyer, 4 ARz. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1962).
163 See, e.g., Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 585, 595 (1965); Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and
the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694, 705 (1966).
164 In In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966), juveniles
objected on appeal that their lawyers had acted as agents of the juve-
nile court in promoting its philosophy and had overly co-operated with
the court's probation staff. This objection was overruled but is indica-
tive of the demand for "real" representation.
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likely to resist the rehabilitative efforts which follow. If, however,
he has confidence that he was adequately defended and that the
state's case was tested but proven, he should be more willing to
accept correction. These viewpoints are merely speculative since
there is no real evidence as to the effects of court procedures and
the conduct of counsel upon the juvenile. Perhaps attorneys and
courts have no effect on the attitudes of the juvenile. 165
Although the attorney should accept the juvenile's wishes and
defend the case, he should make it clear that his objective is to
present a competent defense-and no more. He needs to impress
upon his client that his responsibility is not to obstruct the state's
presentation or to "win" the case, but rather to attempt to see that
his client will be found delinquent only if legally dependable evi-
dence is presented against him. The attorney should attempt to
make certain that delinquency is proven before the matter of dis-
position is considered.
Once the juvenile is found delinquent, the attorney's obligation
does not end. The lawyer can also serve an important role at the
dispositional stage. He can disclose factors related to the matter of
treatment and suggest possible alternatives. If the attorney is aware
of any programs, agencies or other sources of assistance to the juve-
nile, he can help to provide the child with a treatment plan which
best meets his needs. Furthermore, by adequately defending his
client, the attorney will gain the confidence which will make him
the one best suited for explaining the court's decision to the child.
Already attorneys in the criminal courts are perplexed by un-
clear questions of ethics. Attempting to develop yet another code
for the juvenile courts would only increase the confusion while
serving no real purpose. The attorney should offer the juvenile the
same defense he would offer him if he were an adult. By becoming
aware of the philosophy, principles and procedures of the juvenile
court, the attorney can give the juvenile the added protection that
his youth requires by playing a vital role in both the adjudicative
and dispositional stages. In short, the real purpose of the juvenile
court, to serve the best interests of the young, can only be accom-
plished if the child has an attorney committed to his client and
determined to offer him the best defense that his present ethical
and legal limitations will allow. Hopefully, in this manner, both
due process and rehabilitation can become a reality.
165 Lefstein, supra note 22, at 813.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Gault will continue
to be criticized by a few,'6 6 it was generally well reasoned and sound.
This decision must be built upon if the juvenile court is to com-
pletely fulfill its unique function of affording additiondl protec-
tions to our nation's youth.
Juvenile courts were founded on this high ideal. That ideal
must not be abandoned. Additional protections, however, cannot
be provided until the juvenile's basic rights are first granted. Our
country's guarantee of procedural safeguards, both at the state and
federal level, represents the basis of our individual freedom. In
order to obtain their goal of affording additional protection, juvenile
courts must not continue to abandon these standards of procedure
but must accept them and build upon them. Therefore, Gault repre-
sents a beginning and not an end.
More than court decisions will be needed to reach this high
goal. First, the juvenile court's jurisdiction must be limited to
actual cases of alleged illegal acts, with other agencies assuming
responsibility for "wayward" and "neglected" children. Second,
reflection, resources, and research will be essential if we are to
learn to rehabilitate the delinquent child. Of course the greatest
need is for a broad scale attack upon the social evils which are the
root cause of delinquency. Leadership will be the key to reform
and this responsibility must be assumed by the legal fraternity and
the law colleges. Our juvenile crime rate is shocking and our juve-
nile courts have been a failure. However, the ideal is not beyond
our reach. A single step has been taken; more must follow.
H. Bruce Hamilton, '69
166 See Omaha World Herald, Nov. 13, 1967 at 4, col. 1. This editorial
misstates the holding in Gault and then concludes that the decision
"promises to make a bad juvenile crime situation worse."
